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SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S
ANTIMERGER DECISIONS*
by
Charles F. Phillips, Jr.**
N 1950 Congress enacted the Celler-Kefauver Amendment to section 7
of the Clayton Act' and thereby initiated a new era in antitrust policy.
Enforced by both the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department and
by the Federal Trade Commission,' section 7 provides in relevant part:
That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no
corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall
acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged
also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the
country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.

Under the 1950 amendment, the federal enforcement agencies have
issued 203 complaints' of which 154 have been terminated. Only eleven
antimerger decisions, however, have been handed down by the Supreme
Court since 1950-ten under section 7" and one under section 1 of the
Sherman Act.' These eleven decisions indicate the direction that antimerger policy is taking. It is the purpose of this Article to discuss these
decisions and to draw from them implications for the future of antimerger policy.
* The comments and suggestions of Professor Robert E. R. Huntley, Washington and Lee University School of Law are acknowledged with appreciation. The analysis and conclusions, however, are the sole responsibility of the author.
** B.A., University of New Hampshire;
Ph.D., Harvard University. Professor of Economics,
Washington and Lee University.
1 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958). On the background of the amendment see
MERGERS AND THE CLAYTON ACT 221-310 (1959); Handler & Robinson, A Decade of
Administration of the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 652-75 (1961);
Phillips & Hall, Economic and Legal Aspects of Merger Litigation 1951-1962, 10 HoUSTON Bus.
REV. 5, 5-9 (1963); Note, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 766 (1952).
MARTIN,

'See

S. REP. No. 1175, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950).

a 1951-1967 TRADE REG. REP. (March 31, 1967),
'Federal Trade Comm'n v. Procter & Gamble Co.,

87 Sup. Ct. 1224

(1967),

reversing 358

F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1966); United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United
States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Consolidated Foods
Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965);

United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441

(1964);

United

States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
377 U.S. 271 (1964); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294 (1962).
Three cases are currently on appeal before the Supreme

Court: United States v. Continental

Oil Co., 364 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1966), affirming 237 F. Supp. 294 (W.D. Okla.
docketed, 35 US.L. WEEK 3072 (U.S. Aug. 16, 1966) (No. 450); United States
Ilsley Bank Stock Corp., 255 F. Supp. 273 (E.D. Wis. 1966), appeal docketed, 35
3271 (U.S. Jan. 30, 1967) (No. 1017); United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co.,

1964), appeal
v. Marshall &
U.S.L. WEEK
386 U.S. 906

(1967).

'United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665
quently dismissed under the Bank Merger Act Amendment of 1966,
of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958) provides that "every
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."

(1964). The case was subse80 Stat. 7 (1966). Section 1
contract, combination in the
commerce among the several
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THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISIONS

Several facts, at the outset, are worth noting about the Supreme Court's
antimerger decisions. First, the enforcement agencies have a perfect record
before the Court-ten decisions have held that the challenged merger
violated the antitrust laws,' while the eleventh decision involved a remand
of a lower court's dismissal.! Second, in ten of the eleven decisions' the
Supreme Court reversed lower court decisions. Third, the Court itself has
been divided, as evidenced by the fact that only four of the eleven decisions were unanimous,9 and that even in these four decisions nine concurring opinions were written.10
As background, the eleven decisions of the Supreme Court are briefly
summarized below. No attempt has been made to analyze each case in
detail. Rather, the emphasis is upon the basis for the Court's decision in

each case.
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States." In 1956 the Brown Shoe Company,
'Federal Trade Comm'n v. Procter & Gamble Co., 87 Sup. Ct. 1224 (1967); United States
v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270
(1966); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965); United States
v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377
U.S. 271 (1964); United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964); United
States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,
374 U.S. 321 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
In addition to its eleven decisions noted above, the Court has taken the following action in ten
other cases: United States v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd Per
curiam, 385 U.S. 37 (1966); United States v. National Steel Corp., 383 U.S. 905 (1966) (referred
to a lower court for consideration of a settlement agreement, Feb. 27, 1967); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 247 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Mo. 1964), aff'd per casriam, 382 U.S. 12
(1965); United States v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 231 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd per
curiam, 381 U.S. 414 (1965); United States v. FMC Corp., 84 Sup. Ct. 4, affirming 321 F.2d
534 (1963) (denial of preliminary injunction); United States v. Koppers Co., 202 F. Supp. 437
(W.D. Pa. 1962), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 856 (1962); Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. Federal
Trade Comm'n, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 937 (1962); United States v.
Diebold, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 902 (S.D. Ohio 1961), rev'd and remanded per curiam, 369 U.S. 654
(1962); United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd mem.,
365 U.S. 567 (1961), rehearing denied, 365 U.S. 809 (1961); United States v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, 362 U.S. 458 (1960), affirming 168 F. Supp. 880 (D.D.C. 1959).
The Supreme Court also has ordered new hearings on the proposed consent decree in Cascade
Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967), and has held that bank
mergers, under the Bank Merger Act of 1966, are subject to antitrust prosecution. United States
v. First City Nat'l Bank, 87 Sup. Ct. 1088 (1967); United States v. Provident Nat'l Bank (decided
with United States v. First City Nat'l Bank supra).
'United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
'Federal Trade Comm'n v. Procter & Gamble Co., 87 Sup. Ct. 1224 (1967); United States
v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270
(1966); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965); United States
v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S.
158 (1964); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964); United States v.
First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,
376 U.S. 651 (1964); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
' Federal Trade Comm'n v. Procter & Gamble Co., 87 Sup. Ct. 1224 (1967); United States v.
Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Consolidated Foods Corp.,
380 U.S. 592 (1965); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
"Federal Trade Comm'n v. Procter & Gamble Co., supra note 9 (Harlan, J., concurring);
United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., supra note 9 (Douglas, Fortas, Harlan, White, JJ., concurring); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Consolidated Foods Corp., supra note 9 (Harlan and Stewart, JJ.,
concurring); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 9 (Clark and Harlan, JJ., concurring).
"370 U.S. 294 (1962). See Adams & Dirlam, Brown Shoe: In Step With Antitrust, 1963
WASH. U.L.Q. 158; Barnes, The Primacy of Competition and the Brown Shoe Decision, 51 GEO.
L.J. 706 (1963); Implications of Brown Shoe for Merger Law and Enforcement, 8 ANTITRUST
BULL. 225 (1963); Krasnow, Implications of Brown Shoe Co. v. United States on the Law of
Mergers, 23 FED. B.J. 225 (1963); Martin, The Brown Shoe Case and the New Antimerger Policy,
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the fourth largest shoe manufacturer in the country (producing about
four per cent of the total), acquired the G. R. Kinney Company, the
largest family-style shoe store chain with over 400 stores in more than
270 cities (accounting for nearly 1.2 per cent of national retail shoe sales).
Brown also owned a number of retail outlets, while Kinney was the
country's twelfth largest shoe manufacturer. The merger, then, was both

horizontal and vertical."
After reviewing the legislative history of the 1950 amendment, Chief
Justice Warren concluded: "Throughout the recorded discussion may be
found examples of Congress' fear not only of accelerated concentration
of economic power on economic grounds, but also of the threat to other
values a trend toward concentration was thought to pose."" He emphasized, however, that it was the protection of competition, not specific
competitors, that Congress sought and that each merger had to be viewed
in the context of its particular industry." And, with respect to the latter
point, he noted that while market share is the "primary index" of market
power, "only a further examination of the particular market-its structure,
history and probable future-can provide the appropriate setting for
judging the probable anti-competitive effect of the merger.""
To examine a particular market structure, the Court shapes a "relevant
market" composed of a product market and a geographic area of the
country. In Brown Shoe the Court found that the product markets were
the same for both the horizontal and vertical aspects: men's, women's and
children's shoes.' These lines of commerce "are recognized by the public;
each line is manufactured in separate plants; each has characteristics
peculiar to itself rendering it generally non-competitive with the other,
and each is, of course, directed toward a distinct class of customers."'
It found that the geographic market for the vertical aspects of the case
was the nation as a whole, while the geographic markets for the horizontal
aspects were cities with a population of 10,000 or more and their immediate surrounding areas in which both Brown and Kinney sold shoes. The
53 Am. EcoN. REV. 340 (1963); Rahl, Current Antitrust Developments in the Merger Field, 8
ANTITRUST BULL. 493 (1963); Rogers & Litvack, Brown Shoe: The Guidance of a Footnote, 1963
WASH. U.L.Q. 192. See also Note, 27 ALBANY L. REV. 54 (1963); Note, 31 FORDHAM L. REV.
161 (1962); Note, 37 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 147 (1962); Note, 17 Sw. L.J. 286 (1963); Note, 14
SYRACUSE L. REV. 97 (1962); Note, 37 TUL. L. REV. 109 (1962); Note, 10 VILL. L. REV. 734

(1965).
" A vertical merger is an economic arrangement between companies in a supplier-customer relationship. Absorption of a company in the same general product line is termed a horizontal merger.
4aBrown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 316 (1962).
' 1d. at 320.
5
' d. at 322, n.38:
[W]hether the consolidation was to take place in

an industry that was fragmented

rather than concentrated, that had seen a recent trend toward domination by a few
leaders or had remained fairly consistent in its distribution of market shares among
the participating companies, that had experienced easy access to markets by suppliers

and easy access to suppliers by buyers or had witnessed foreclosure of business, that
had witnessed the ready entry of new competition or the erection of barriers to prospective entrants, all were aspects, varying in importance with the merger under consideration, which would properly be taken into account.
is Relevant markets are the areas of effective competition and are determined by reference to
product and geographic markets (lines of commerce and sections of the country).
17 370 U.S. 294, at 326.
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latter markets were considered large enough to include both downtown
shops and suburban shopping centers, which provide keen competition
with one another, and yet the markets were considered small enough to
exclude stores further away which provide little competition. "
In reaching its decision concerning the probable adverse competitive
impact of the merger, the Court stressed the following factors: first,
Brown's past policy of forcing its own brand of shoes upon its retail
outlets-a policy that would foreclose competitors from a substantial share
of an otherwise fragmented market;19 second, the trend toward vertical
20
shoe industry;
integration and concentration through mergers in the
and, third, the fact that vertical integration, which may result in economies of scale, may at the same time make it more difficult for independents
to compete. 1 Further, in a significant footnote, the Court stressed its
preference for growth by internal expansion rather than by merger:
A company's history of expansion through mergers presents a different
economic picture than a history of expansion through unilateral growth.
Internal expansion is more likely to be the result of increased demand for the
company's products and is more likely to provide increased investment in
plants, more jobs and greater output. Conversely, expansion through merger
is more likely to reduce available consumer choice while providing no increase
in industry capacity, job or output. It was for these reasons, among others,
Congress expressed its disapproval of successive acquisitions. 2
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank.2 In 1961 the Department of
Justice filed suit challenging the proposed merger of the Philadelphia
National Bank and the Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank under both
section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act. Two
questions were at issue: Were bank mergers subject to the provisions of
the Clayton Act? Did the proposed merger violate the antitrust laws?
The district court answered the former question in the negative, but then
went on to argue that even if bank mergers were subject to section 7, the
merger would not violate that section. 4 The Supreme Court reversed both
findings.
With respect to the probable effect of the merger on competition, the
5
Court held that the relevant product market was "commercial banking,"
1SId. at 294.
59 Id. at 330, 331. The Court noted, however, that in vertical integration cases, market shares
"will seldom be determinative" and, unless either very large or very small, concentration "cannot
itself be decisive." id. at 328, 329.
0
2
Id. at 332.
2

1Id.at 344.

2

Id. at 345.
2a 374 U.S. 321 (1963). Ellis, Antitrust, Bank Mergers and the P.M.B. Decision, 81 BANKING
L.J. 303 (1964). See also series of articles from NAT'L BANKING REV., reprinted in STUDIES IN
BANKING COMPETITION AND THE BANKING STRUCTURES 3-96 (1966); Note, 47 MARQ. L. REV.
289 (1963); Note, 62 MICH. L. REV. 990 (1964); Note, 25 U. PITT. L. REV. 563 (1964).
'The district court further reasoned that if the merger would not violate the Clayton Act,
it could not violate the stricter Sherman Act. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 201 F.
Supp. 348 (E.D. Pa. 1962), rev'd, 374 U.S. 321 (1962).
[T]he cluster of products (various kinds of credit) and services (such as checking
accounts and trust administration) denoted by the term 'commercial banking' . . .
composes a distinct line of commerce. Some commercial banking products or services
are so distinctive that they are entirely free of effective competition from products

1967]

ANTIMERGER DECISIONS

while the relevant geographic market was the four-county Philadelphia
metropolitan area in which the two banks were permitted by state law
to operate branches, and from which the major portion of their business
originated." Within this market, Philadelphia National Bank and Girard
were respectively the second and third largest of forty-two commercial
banks. The merger, if consummated, would have made the resulting bank
the largest in the area with at least thirty per cent of the banking business and would have increased the market share of the two largest banks
from forty-four to fifty-nine percent. The Court noted that the existing
size of both Philadelphia National Bank and Girard was in part the result
of mergers, that there was a definite trend toward concentration in commercial banking in the Philadelphia area, and that entry into the banking
industry "is far from easy."2 But the crux of the decision concerned the
market share percentages. After stating that Congress' motivation for
enacting the 1950 amendment was "a rising tide of economic concentration," the Court said:
This intense congressional concern with the trend toward concentration warrants dispensing, in certain cases, with elaborate proof of market structure,
market behavior, or probable anticompetitive effects. Specifically, we think
that a merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share
of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen competition
substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly
showing that the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects."'

United States v. First Nat'l Bank d Trust Co.29 A 1961 merger of two
Lexington, Kentucky, banks was challenged by the Department of Justice
under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. In 1964, the Supreme Court
or services of other financial institutions; the checking account is in this category.
Others enjoy such cost advantages as to be insulated within a broad range from substitutes furnished by other institutions, For example, commercial banks compete
with small-loan companies in the personal-loan market; but the small-loan companies'
rates are invariably much higher than the banks', in part, it seems, because the companies' working capital consists in substantial part of bank loans. Finally, there are
banking facilities which, although in terms of cost and price they are freely competitive with the facilities provided by other financial institutions, nevertheless enjoy a
settled consumer preference, insulating them, to a marked degree, from competition;
this seems to be the case with savings deposits. In sum, it is clear that commercial
banking is a market 'sufficiently inclusive to be meaningful in terms of trade realities.'
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 355-57 (1963). (Citations omitted.)
2 Id. at 359-60. "The factor of inconvenience localizes banking competition as effectively as high
transportation costs in other industries." Ibid. At the same time, the Court recognized that this
market was not delineated with perfect accuracy. Large borrowers and depositors, for instance, are
not confined to their local communities in carrying out banking business. "But that in banking the
relevant geographical market is a function of each separate customer's economic scale means simply
that 7a workable compromise must be found." Id. at 361.
2 Id. at 367.
58Id. at 364-65. The Court also rejected the three affirmative justifications advanced by the
defendants. The fact that the merger would permit the two banks to follow their customers to
the suburbs and retain their business had no merit in view of the available alternative to the merger
route-the opening of new branches. The fact that the merger would enable the resulting bank to
offer very large loans, thereby competing more effectively with the New York banks, could not
justify the merger. And the fact that the proposed merger might have social and economic benefits
to the community served (such as stimulating the area's economic development) could not save
the merger.
2s376 U.S. 665 (1964). See Note, Merger Litigation Under the Sherman Act--Choice or Echo,
1S Sw. L.J. 712 (1964).
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held that the merger violated section 1, reversing a lower court decision."
The Court found that the merger resulted in one bank's controlling over
fifty per cent of the assets and deposits, and over ninety per cent of the
trust business in the relevant market. (The product market was "commercial banking"; the geographic market was Fayette County.) While
no "predatory" purpose in the merger was found, the Court concluded
that "significant competition" would be eliminated. In the words of
Justice Douglas:
There is testimony in the record from three of the four remaining banks
that the consolidation will seriously affect their ability to compete effectively
over the years; that the 'image' of 'bigness' is a powerful attraction to customers, an advantage that increases progressively with disparity in size; and
that the multiplicity of extra services in the trust field which the new
company could offer tends to foreclose competition there. 3
In reaching its decision, the Court referred to a series of railroad cases
decided in the early 1900's." These cases established the proposition that
if merging companies are major competitors in a relevant market, the
elimination of significant competition between them, by merger, itself
constitutes a violation of section 1. Here, the two banks in question had
a very large share of the relevant market. 3 The Court also distinguished
the present case from its 1948 Columbia Steel decision,' in which it relaxed
the stringent standards of the railroad cases, by holding that the latter
decision should be confined to its specific facts."

United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.' In 1959 El Paso Natural
Company, at that time the sole out-of-state supplier of natural gas in
California, acquired Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp., a distributor of
natural gas for resale in Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Utah, and Colorado.
The district court, in dismissing the section 7 suit brought by the Department of Justice, held that since the two companies were not in competition
prior to the merger, there was no state or area or section of the country
in which the stock acquisition and merger could have had a reasonable
probability of substantially lessening competition or of creating a monopoly in the sale or transportation of natural gas for distribution or use.
The Supreme Court, in reversing the lower court, noted that when the
Federal Power Commission grants authorization to a company to construct facilities to serve a particular market, it withdraws that market
from competition. However, rivalry continues to exist due to expanding
needs for additional gas.' At the time of the merger, Pacific Northwest,
"3United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 208 F. Supp. 457 (E.D. Ky. 1962),
376 U.S. 665 (1964).
" United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
"United States v. Southern Pac., 359 U.S. 214
U.S. 26 (1920); United States v. Union Pac. Ry., 226
States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
"United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
'" United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S.
"United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
"4United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376
'7

ibid.

3' Id. at 660.

rev'd,

376 U.S. 665, 669 (1964).
(1922); United States v. Reading Co., 253
U.S. 61 (1912); Northern Sec. Co. v. United
376
495
376
U.S.

U.S. 665, 672 (1964).
(1948).
U.S. 665, 672 (1964).
651 (1964).
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although smaller and newer than El Paso Natural Gas, was the only other
important interstate pipeline company west of the Rocky Mountains. It
was, moreover, trying to break into the California market. Although
Pacific's success could not be predicted, Justice Douglas noted that "unsuccessful bidders are no less competitors than the successful ones." 3

United States v. Aluminum Co. of America." The acquisition of an
aluminum and copper conductor (wire and, cable) producer, Rome Cable,

by an integrated aluminum producer, Alcoa, was challenged under section
7 of the Clayton Act by the Department of Justice in 1960. Since Rome
Cable produced both aluminum and copper conductor (but primarily
copper), while Alcoa produced only aluminum conductor, the heart of the
case involved the definition of the relevant product market.

The Supreme Court found that the relevant product market was aluminum conductor (bare and insulated)." In 1958 Alcoa had 27.8 per cent
and Rome Cable 1.3 per cent of this market. 2 The latter's relatively small
market share was not decisive, as the Court stressed its concern about the

oligopolistic 3 nature of the aluminum industry with the greater likelihood
that parallel policies of mutual advantage, not competition, would emerge.
The Court concluded that such a tendency might be thwarted by the
presence of small but significant competitors."
Rome Cable, held the Court, was just such a small but significant competitor. It ranked ninth among all manufacturers of aluminum conductor
and fourth among independents. And, in an industry where at least a
dozen companies account for less than one per cent of production, the
removal of a company with 1.3 per cent of the market would eliminate
a significant competitor. The Court found that Rome Cable was an
"aggressive competitor" and a "pioneer" in aluminum insulation." The
effectiveness of its marketing organization was attested to by the fact that,
after the acquisition, Alcoa made Rome Cable the distributor of its entire
conductor line. Concluded Justice Douglas: "Preservation of Rome, rather
39 Id. at 661-62. See also Abramson, Private Competition and Public Regulation, I NAT'L
(1963); Hale & Hale, Competition or Control VI: Application of Antitrust
Laws to Regulated Industries, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 46 (1964); Stokes, Few Irreverent Comments
Agency
Regulation, and Primary jurisdiction, 33 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 529
About Antitrust,
(1964); Note, Regulated Industries and the Antitrust Laws: Substantive and Procedural Coordination, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 673 (1958).
40377 U.S. 271 (1964).
41 Both types [aluminum and copper] are used for the purpose of conducting electricity
and are sold to the same customers, electric utilities. While the copper conductor does
compete with aluminum conductor, each has developed distinctive end uses-aluminum as an overhead conductor and copper for underground and indoor wiring, application in which aluminum's brittleness and larger size render it impractical.
And . . . the price differential further sets them apart.
Id. at 277. The Court also found that insulated aluminum conductor and bare aluminum conductor
were relevant submarkets.
42 With respect to the submarkets, Alcoa's share of insulated aluminum conductor was 11.6 per
cent and Rome Cable's share was 4.7 per cent in 1958; Alcoa's share of bare aluminum conductor
was 32.5 per cent and Rome Cable's share was 0.3 per cent in 1958. Id. at 273-74.
4 LEFTWICH, THE PRICE SYSTEM AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION 233 (rev. ed. 1961). "[Oligopolistic competition is found in] market situations in which there are few enough sellers of a
particular product for the activities of one to be of importance to the others."
44377 U.S. at 280.
4Id.
at 281.

BANKING REV. 101-05
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than its absorption by one of the giants, will keep it 'as an important
competitive factor,' . . . Rome seems to us the prototype of the small
independent that Congress aimed to preserve by § 7."
United States v. Continental Can Co.4 1 In 1956 the nation's second
largest producer of metal containers, Continental Can Company, acquired
the country's third largest producer of glass containers, Hazel-Atlas Glass
Company. Seven years later, a lower court ruled that the acquisition did
not violate section 7, holding that since there was no evidence of active
competition between metal and glass containers or between specific lines
of either company, there was no adverse effect upon competition. In short,
the acquisition was conglomerate.48
The Supreme Court's reversal rested almost entirely upon the determination of the relevant product market. The Court noted that "it must
recognize meaningful competition where it is found" and that section 7
protects both inter-industry and intra-industry competition."' It then
concluded that "the inter-industry competition between glass and metal
containers is sufficient to warrant treating as a relevant product market
the combined glass and metal container industries and all end uses for
which they compete.""
In judging the competitive impact of the merger, the Court found that
in 1958 Continental Can produced thirty-three per cent of all metal
containers sold in the country, while Hazel-Atlas accounted for 9.6 per
cent of the glass containers shipped. The combined glass-and-metal container market was highly concentrated, with six firms accounting for
70.1 per cent of the business. The merger increased Continental Can's
share of the combined market from 21.9 per cent to twenty-five per cent
and reduced the number of significant competitors who might threaten
its position from five to four. "The resulting percentage of the combined
firms approaches that held presumptively bad in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, . . . and is almost the same as that involved in
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, . . . The incremental addition to
1 the acquiring firm's share is considerably larger than in Aluminum
Co.,)5
The Court refused to accept Continental Can's argument that, whatever the amount of inter-industry competition generally, the types of
containers produced by the two companies were for the most part not
4 Ibid.
4' 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
48 United States v. Continental Can Co., 217 F. Supp. 761

(S.D.N.Y. 1963), rev'd, 378 U.S.
441, 449 (1964). Conglomerate mergers can best be defined as all mergers neither horizontal nor
vertical. See note 12 supra. See also note 82 infra.
49 378 U.S. at 449.
"Old. at 457.
There may be some end uses for which glass and metal do not and could not compete, but complete inter-industry competitive overlap need not be shown. We would
not be true to the purpose of the Clayton Act's line of commerce concept as a frame-

work within which to measure the effect of mergers on competition were we to hold
that the existence of noncompetitive segments within a proposed market area precludes its being treated as a line of commerce.

51 Id. at 461.

1967]

ANTIMERGER DECISIONS

in competition. The Court noted that (a) since there was significant interindustry competition between some of each company's products prior to
the merger, the acquisition foreclosed actual competition; (b) since Continental Can had engaged in "vigorous and imaginative promotional activities" to overcome consumer preference for glass in other end uses, the
merger foreclosed potential competition; and (c) the merger might trigger
"other mergers by companies seeking the same competitive advantages
sought by Continental in this case." 5
United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co."s Penn-Olin Chemical, a joint
venture of Pennsalt Chemicals Corp. and Olin Mathieson Corp., was
created in 1960 to operate a plant for the production and sale of sodium
chlorate in the southeastern part of the United States. Prior to the formation of Penn-Olin, Olin Mathieson had never produced sodium chlorate
for sale in any market, while Pennsalt had manufactured the product in
its west coast plant but had never been a substantial supplier to the southeastern market. In 1961 the Department of Justice brought a suit seeking
to dissolve the joint venture as violative of both section 7 of the Clayton
Act and section 1 of the Sherman Act.
A lower court held that although Pennsalt and Olin Mathieson had for
many years considered going into the southeastern market individually,
each had concluded that it could not enter the market profitably alone.
The court thus found that since there was no evidence that both companies
would have gone into the market, there was no probability of a substantial
lessening of competition." Moreover, noted the court, the joint venture had
not prevented entry: after the formation of Penn-Olin, Pittsburgh Plate
Glass had announced that it would also build a plant in the southeast.
The Supreme Court, in vacating and remanding the decision, held that
the lower court should have made a finding as to the reasonable probability that, if either of the companies had built a plant independently,
the other would have remained "at the edge of the market, continually
threatening to enter." Continued the Court: "Just as a merger eliminates
actual competition, this joint venture may well foreclose any prospect
of competition between Olin and Pennsalt in the relevant sodium chlorate
market. The difference, of course, is that the merger's foreclosure is present
while the joint venture's is prospective.""
Referring to its holding in El Paso, that potential competition is as
relevant a consideration as actual competition, the Court noted: "The
existence of an aggressive, well-equipped and well-financed corporation
'l Id. at 461-66.

53378 U.S. 158 (1964). See Backman, Joint Ventures and the Antitrust Laws, 40 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 651 (1965); Berghoff, Antitrust Aspects of Joint Ventures, 9 ANTITRUST BULL. 303 (1960);
Dixon, Joint Ventures: What Is Their Impact on Competition?, 7 ANTITRUST BULL. 397 (1962);

Tractenberg, Joint Ventures on the Domestic Front: A Study in Uncertainty, 8 ANTITRUST BULL.
797 (1963).

See also Note, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 712

(1962); Note, 14 STAN.

L. REV. 777 (1962);

Note, 39 U. DET. L.J. 223 (1961); Note, 9 VILL. L. REv. 94 (1963).
" United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 217 F. Supp. 110 (D. Del. 1963), vacated and remanded, 378 U.S. 158 (1964). Since the joint venture did not violate the Clayton Act, the court
held that it could not violate the more stringent standard imposed by the Sherman Act.
" 378 U.S. at 173-74. (Emphasis added.)
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engaged in the same or related lines of commerce waiting anxiously to

enter an oligopolistic market would be a substantial incentive to competition which cannot be underestimated.""6 The lower court should have
made a finding, therefore, as to the probability that one of the companies would have entered the market while the other would have remained
a significant potential competitor."
Federal Trade Comm'n v. ConsolidatedFoods Corp." Consolidated Foods,
a large food processor, wholesaler, and retailer, purchased Gentry, a producer of dehydrated onions and garlic, in 1951. Eleven years later, the
FTC ruled that the merger violated section 7 since it gave Consolidated
Foods the "power to extort or simply attract reciprocal purchases from
suppliers" and, thereby, "to foreclose competition from a substantial share
of the market for dehydrated onion and garlic."'" The FTC's decision was
reversed by the court of appeals in 1964, largely on the grounds that
ten years of post-acquisition experience served to show that Gentry had
not appreciably expanded its volume of sales despite the buying power of
Consolidated Foods behind it."°
The Supreme Court, in reversing the lower court, held that reciprocity
"results in 'an irrelevant and alien factor' . . . intruding into the choice
among competing products, creating at the least 'a priority on the business at equal prices.' . . . Reciprocity in trading as a result of an acquisition
violates § 7, if the probability of a lessening of competition is shown."'
The Court found that the FTC's ruling was supported by evidence that
Consolidated Foods tried repeatedly to exercise reciprocity with some success. Gentry, despite offering an inferior product and operating in a
rapidly expanding market, was able to increase its share of the onion
market by seven per cent and to hold its losses in the garlic market to
twelve per cent." It noted that since 1950 the relevant markets had been
highly concentrated, with two firms accounting for nearly ninety per
"Id. at 174.
" Ibid. The district court, on remand, again dismissed the suit, finding that there was no reasonable probability of either firm's independent entry. 246 F. Supp. 917 (D. Del. 1965). The
Government appealed for the second time and jurisdiction was noted on February 13, 1967. 386

U.S. 906 (1967).
3'380 U.S. 594 (1965). See Amer, Realistic Reciprocity, 40 HARV. Bus. REV. 116 (1962);
Asper, Reciprocity, Purchasing Power and Competition, 48 MINN. L. REV. $23 (1964); Dean,
Economic Aspects of Reciprocity, Competition and Mergers, 8 ANTITRUST BULL. 843 (1963);
Donnem, The Conglomerate Merger and Reciprocity, 8 ANTITRUST BULL. 283 (1963); Goldstein,
Reciprocity-Antitrust Violation by Natural Reaction, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 832 (1964); Handler, Emerging Antitrust Issues: Reciprocity, Diversification and Joint Ventures, 49 VA. L. REv. 433,
433-40 (1963); Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments-1965, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 823, 837-44
(1965); Harvith, Reciprocity and the Federal Antitrust Laws, 40 WASH. L. REv. 133 (1965);
Krash, The Legality of Reciprocity Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 9 ANTITRUST BULL. 93
(1964); Marsha, The Conglomerate Merger and Reciprocity-Condemned by Conjecture?, 9
ANTITRUST BULL. 201 (1964); Comment, Reciprocal Dealing and the Antitrust Laws, 77 HARV.
L. REv. 873 (1964). See also Note, 39 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 185 (1964); Note, 20 Sw. L.J. 192
(1966); Note, 49 VA. L. REv. 852 (1963).
"In re Consolidated Foods Corp., 54 F.T.C. 1900 (1958).
0
" Consolidated Foods Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 329 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1964), rev'd,
380 U.S. 592 (1965).
"1Federal Trade Comm'n v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
6" Significantly, it was the same post-acquisition date which led the court of appeals to reverse
the FTC's decision.
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cent of both product lines. Further, by strengthening the market power
of the two majors, future entry by others was discouraged.
United States v. Von's Grocery Co."5 In 1960 Von's Grocery, the third

largest Los Angeles grocery chain, acquired Shopping Bag Food Stores,
the sixth largest. The Supreme Court ruled that the merger violated section 7 in 1966.

The Court found that both companies were highly successful, expanding, and aggressive chains in the relevant market-the retail grocery
market in Los Angeles. The merger created the second largest grocery
chain in the area (behind Safeway), with sales equal to 7.5 per cent of

the area's $2.5 billion grocery sales. The area, moreover, was characterized
by a long and continuous trend toward fewer individually-owned competitors. Thus, between 1950 and 1961 the number of single store owners
declined from 5,365 to 3,818; by 1963, three years after the merger,

there had been a further decline to 3,590. During roughly the same period,
1953 to 1962, the number of chains with more than two stores increased
from ninety-six to one hundred fifty. Finally, from 1949 to 1958, nine

of the top twenty firms acquired one hundred twenty-six stores from
their smaller competitors. "These facts alone," wrote Justice Black for the
majority, "are enough to cause us to conclude contrary to the District
Court that the Von's-Shopping Bag merger did violate § 7." And, after
noting that the basic purpose of the 1950 amendment "was to prevent
economic concentration in the American economy by keeping a large

number of small competitors in business,"" he concluded:
It is enough for us that Congress feared that a market marked at the same
time by both a continuous decline in the number of small businesses and a
large number of mergers would, slowly but inevitably, gravitate from a
market of many small competitors to one dominated by one or a few giants,
and competition would thereby be destroyed."
United States v. Pabst Brewing Co. 7 In 1958 Pabst Brewing Company,
the nation's tenth largest brewer, acquired the Blatz Brewing Company,
the eighteenth largest-a merger which resulted in the fifth largest brewer
with 4.49 per cent of the industry's total sales and the third largest brewer
with 5.83 per cent of the market three years thereafter. The Department
of Justice's 1959 suit challenging the merger under section 7 was dismissed by a lower court in 1964, holding that the Government failed to
prove its claimed relevant geographic market (either Wisconsin or the
three-state area of Wisconsin, Michigan and Illinois) and to show that
the probable effect of the merger was to lessen competition in the beer
03384 U.S. 270 (1966). See Bison, The Von's Merger Case-Antitrust in Reverse, 55 GEo.
L.J. 201 (1966); Handler, Some Misadventures in Antitrust Policymaking-Nineteenth Annual
Review, 76 YALE L.J. 92, 101-09 (1966); Note, Horizontal Grocery Chain Merger Invalidated
Under Clayton Act, Section 7, 20 Sw. L.J. 420 (1966); Turner, "The Merits of Antimerger
Policy," speech before the Los Angeles Town Hall Forum, March 7, 1967, reprinted in S TRADE
REG. REP., 5 50165 (1967).
"United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 274 (1966).
6
5Id. at 275.
"Id. at 278.
67384 U.S. 546 (1966).
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industry in the continental United States." The Supreme Court, on appeal,
reversed and remanded the case.
With respect to the geographic market, the Court said that the law
merely requires the Government to prove that a merger "has a substantial
anticompetitive effect somewhere in the United States-'in any section'
of the United States. This phrase does not call for the delineation of a
'section of the country' by metes and bounds as a surveyor would lay off
a plot of ground.""

With respect to the probable competitive impact of the merger on
competition, the Court pointed out that the merger took place in an

industry marked by a steady trend toward economic concentration. The
number of breweries operating in the country declined from 714 in 1934
to 229 in 1961, while the total number of different competitors selling
beer decreased from 206 in 1957 to 162 in 1961. At the same time, the
Court noted, the leading brewers have been increasing their share of the
industry's sales.7" Finally, the Court rejected Pabst's argument that the
trend toward concentration in the beer industry was not shown to be

via mergers. "We hold," argued the Court, "that a trend toward concentration in an industry, whatever its cause, is a highly relevant factor
in deciding how substantial the anti-competitive effect of a merger may
71
be.
Federal Trade Comm'n v. Procter F Gamble Co."' In 1957 the Federal
Trade Commission filed a complaint charging that the acquisition by
Procter & Gamble Company of all the assets of the Clorox Chemical
Company violated section 7 of the Clayton Act. After hearings were held
to determine the impact of the merger upon the liquid household bleach
market, the Commission ordered divestiture by Procter & Gamble of the
Clorox assets. 3 Reversing the Commission's decision, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that there was no probability
of a substantial lessening of competition. '4 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and reinstated the Commission's divestiture order.'
The Court's opinion emphasized Procter's size in comparison with the
other companies in the liquid bleach industry. At the time of the merger
Clorox held a commanding sales lead, outpacing its nearest competitor,
Purex, in national sales. Clorox accounted for 48.8 per cent of the national market; Purex, 15.7 per cent; and the next four firms, fifteen per
cent. Thus, the market was markedly oligopolistic, with a great void be" United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 233 F. Supp. 475 (E.D. Wis. 1964), rev'd and remanded,
384 U.S. 546 (1966).
69384 U.S. at 549.
7
11d. at 550.
71Id. at 552. "Congress, in passing § 7 and in amending it with the Celler-Kefauver AntiMerger Amendment, was concerned with arresting concentration in American economy, whatever
its cause, in its incipiency."
7'Federal Trade Comm'n v. Procter & Gamble Co., 87 Sup. Ct. 1224 (1967).
73
Procter & Gamble Co., TRADE REG. REP. 5 16673 (1963-1965 Transfer Binder).
4
' Procter & Gamble Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 358 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1966), rev'd, 87
Sup. Ct. 1224 (1967).
" Federal Trade Comm'n v. Procter & Gamble Co., 87 Sup. Ct. 1224 (1967), reversing 358
F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1966).
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tween the market leaders and nearly two hundred small, regional producers. Moreover, characterizing liquid bleach as a high-turnover consumer product, the Court pointed to widespread use of media advertising
in the bleach market and in Procter's other product lines."' As there was
no physical differentiation between bleach lines, the disparity of size,
asset position, and advertising potential, was used to support a finding that
Procter crystalized entry barriers to new firms and hindered free price
movements by existing firms. "It is probable that Procter would become
the price leader and that oligopoly would become more rigid.""
Turning from size considerations, the Court invalidated the merger
on another ground: the elimination of Procter as a potential competitor in
the liquid bleach industry. Taking its cue from the language of Penn-Olin,
the Court viewed Procter as the most likely entrant and held that its
elimination from the edge of the market lessened competitive force within
the industry."'

Procter & Gamble can be viewed as the Court's application of its restrictive standards for horizontal and vertical mergers to conglomerate
acquisitions. Notwithstanding its post-merger size, Procter had no apparent inclination to use its asset position to engage in predatory pricing;
nor had Procter engaged in such pricing tactics in its independent history
before the combination.""
II. SOME IMPLICATIONS

The Supreme Court's decisions obviously project a strict antimerger
policy and a preference for internal growth. Moreover, under the standards
enumerated by the Court, it would seem possible to invalidate almost any
merger challenged by the enforcement agencies. In the case of horizontal
mergers, a strict antimerger policy seems fully justified because significant
economies can generally be obtained by internal growth."s In the case of
vertical and conglomerate mergers, however, a strict antimerger policy is
more likely to conflict with efficiency goals. A vertical merger may extend
market power from one production stage to another, but it cannot create
market power. Further, internal expansion is more difficult since the firm
is entering a new market. "1 A conglomerate merger does not increase the
market position of the merged firms, so that the traditional objection to
such a merger rests upon absolute size, i.e., the size of a conglomerate
firm gives it the power to inflict competitive injury upon rivals.
7687 Sup. Ct. at 1230.
77Ibid.

"I1d. at 1231.
'9358 F.2d at 81-82.
"°Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1313,
1320-21 (1965). "[A] firm with growth or expansion opportunities in its own field, that is already
exerting competitive pressures, is likely to resort to internal expansion if the merger route to
growth isclosed."
81 See Dean & Gustus, Vertical Integration and Section 7, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 672 (1965);
Singer, Vertical Integration and Economic Growth, 50 A.B.A.J. 555 (1964).
" As Adams has defined conglomerate power: "This means that a firm's operations are so widely
diversified that its survival no longer depends on success in any given product market or any given
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For the above reasons, among others, the 1950 amendment contains a
competitive test-"where in any line of commerce in any section of the
country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." Concluded Handler and
Robinson after a careful analysis of the 1950 amendment:
The courts, in the final analysis, must set the permissible limits of mergers
on an individual basis within the statutory framework. They are given no
license to apply their own social and economic predilections as to whether
growth by merger is good or bad for the economy. Their mandate is to
interdict those acquisitions, and only those acquisitions, the effect of which
'may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.'8 3
In developing and applying its diverse standards the Court has indicated its willingness to protect small competitors, even at the expense of
economic efficiency, by equating a probable lessening of competition with
a possible injury to a competitor, rather than to a possible injury to
competition. " Also, the Court has placed increased emphasis upon market
shares and concentration data in an effort to find "a more rigid, easily
definable rule concerning probable lessening of competition or tendency
to monopoly, one which can be applied without burdensome economic
analysis."'" As a consequence the philosophical foundation of a strict antimerger policy has been destroyed and the discretionary power of the
enforcement agencies has been considerably broadened.

The Protection of Competitors In its Brown Shoe decision, the Court
outlined criteria for testing the competitive effects of a merger and,
thereby, indicated its preference for a market power standard. By that
standard, a merger is illegal if it increases the ability of the resulting firm
to control the price or output of a product in a specified market area.
But having established these criteria, the Court promptly proceeded to
ignore them. To quote from the decision:
The retail outlets of integrated companies, by eliminating wholesalers and
by increasing the volume of purchases from the manufacturing division of
the enterprise, can market their own brands at prices below those of competing independent retailers. . . . Their expansion is not rendered unlawful
by the mere fact that small independent stores may be adversely affected.
It is competition, not competitors, which the Act protects. But we cannot
geographical area. Its absolute size, its sheer bigness, is so impressive that it can discipline or destroy
its more specialized competitors." Quoted in 8 ANTITRUST BULL. 304 (1963). See also Edwards,

Conglomerate Bigness as a Source of Power, in

BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY

331

(1955); Stocking, Comment, id. at 352; %Bliir,The Conglomerate Merger in Economics and Law,
46 GEo. L.J. 672 (1958); Hart, Emerging Paradoxes in Antitrust, 30 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION
80, 82 (1966). Adelman has argued, however, that size should not be equated with either monopoly
power or market control. He concludes that when courts use size as a guide "competition-pure,
workable, effective, or whatever-has vanished, replaced by protectionism." Adelman, The Antimerger Act, 1950-60, 51 AM. EcoN. REV., May 1961, No. 2, pp. 236, 243.
83 Handler & Robinson, A Decade of Administration of the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act,
61 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 679 (1961).
"See Adelman, supra note 82; von Kalinowski, Section 7 and Competitive Effects, 48 VA. L.
REV. 827 (1962).
"Rill, The Trend Toward Social Competition Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 54 GEO.
L.J. 891, 898 (1966). A similar conclusion, according to Markham, applies to the FTC. Markham,
The Federal Trade Commission's Use of Economics, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 405 (1964).
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fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition through the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that
occasional higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of
fragmented industries and markets. It resolved these competing considerations
infavor of decentralization."
Two comments are pertinent. First, despite its insistence that it is

"competition, not competitors, which the Act protects," the Court is
citing potential economies of integration as a factor invalidating the merger." Put another way, market structure and not competition becomes
the relevant test. Second, while there is little support for the proposition
that Congress recognized the possible conflict between the achievement of
efficiency and the preservation of fragmented markets, and resolved the
conflict in favor of decentralization," there are strong arguments against

using cost savings as a basis for holding mergers illegal under the antitrust laws.
Indeed, there is a national interest in having the most efficient and
economical resource allocation, and in some cases there is every reason to
believe that resource allocation is most efficient when assets or management
are channelled in new directions through merger. Overzealous application
of rigid standards of legality ostensibly to protect small business units
may, in the long run, cause their demise in certain industry situations.
When the capital market is swept bare by a collective fear of antitrust
prosecutions, assets and production potential of small, marginal businesses
may be left to wither on the vine instead of being absorbed and used within
healthy firms. At any rate, the apparent fear that the small business unit,
like the buffalo, may vanish from the American scene if not protected
within well-defined preserves simply does not find support under current
conditions. 8
8" Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).

8 "No matter how many times you read it, the passage states: Although mergers are not rendered unlawful by the mere fact that small independent stores may be adversely affected, we must
recognize that mergers are unlawful when small independent stores may be adversely affected."
Bork & Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, FORTUNE, December 1963, pp. 138, 197. But see
Dirlam, The Celler-Kefauver Act: A Review of Enforcement Policy, in ADMINISTERED PRICES:
A COMPENDIUM ON PUBLIC POLICY, Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Committee
on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 (1963).
8" Handler & Robinson, supra note 83. But see Blake & Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, FoRTUNE, August 1964, p. 176.
8 First, there is the enormous social interest in progress and efficiency, which has represented one of the primary bases for the policy of promoting competition as it has in
fact evolved. Second, to forbid mergers that would or might produce substantial
efficiencies would narrow substantially the category of acceptable mergers, thereby
drastically weakening the market for capital assets and seriously depreciating the price
that entrepreneurs could get for their businesses when they wish to liquidate ...
Third, the protection that this policy would afford to small business, except in the
short run, is at best highly conjectural and probably negligible. There is no doubt
that in most instances, certainly when efficiencies from integration are substantial,
the same adverse consequences to small business will sooner or later be visited through
internal expansion by large firms ...
Finally, . . . the fact is that no threat, not even a mild one, appears to exist. There
is some evidence that the concentration of assets in the hands of the largest business
firms has risen somewhat over the past several decades. But there is little or no indication that any relative decline in the opportunities for small businesses has occurred.
Turner supra note 80, at 1326, 1327. See also Day, Conglomerate Mergers and "The Curse of Bigness," 42 N.C.L. REv. 511, 566 (1964). As Adelman has argued:
Horizontal and vertical integration will often serve to limit monopoly or destroy
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Potential injury to smaller rivals, of course, was not the only basis for
the Court's Brown Shoe decision. The Court's protectionist policy, however, has grown stronger in subsequent decisions. In Alcoa, where concentration would hardly have been affected by the merger, the Court held
that Rome Cable was an "aggressive" small independent which Congress
wished to preserve. And in Von's Grocery, where the combined sales of
the two companies were 7.5 per cent of the Los Angeles retail grocery
market, the Court stressed its concern over "a continuous decline in the
number of small busineses," and made little analysis of competition in the
relevant market."
Interrelated with the protection of smaller competitors is the Court's
tendency to find a probable lessening of competition whenever there is a
possibility of injury to a competitor. To quote Markham:
There are persuasive economic reasons for associating a healthy climate
for small business with effective competition throughout the economy. But
there is a fundamental difference between preserving opportunities for small
business generally and preserving and protecting particular small businesses
in the markets they presently occupy. The courts, including the Supreme
Court, have gone a long way toward accepting the rule of 'injury to competitors' and rejecting the necessity of an economic analysis of effects on
competition."'
Market Shares and Concentration Data Increasingly in antimerger decisions the Court has stressed market shares and concentration data.'
The position of the Court was well summarized in Continental Can:
"Where a merger is of such a size as to be inherently suspect, elaborate
proof of market structure, market behavior and probable anti-competitive
effects may be dispensed with in view of § 7's design to prevent undue
concentration."'" While market shares may be the "primary indicia of
market power," they cannot serve as a proxy for all the determinants of
competitive behavior.' Further, when is a merger "of such a size as to
be inherently suspect"? In establishing a "thirty per cent ceiling" rule
on market shares in Philadelphia Nat'l Bank (a ceiling subsequently reduced in Continental Can and Pabst), the Court cited tests proposed by
it. For example, vertical integration may be the response to a supplier's monopoly:
by making instead of buying, one by-passes the toll gate. A similar tactic may end
a buying monopoly. Diversification may serve a similar purpose: if there are monopoly
profits being earned in a product which a firm can easily add to its line, it will
probably enter the field in order to share them.
Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HARV. L. REV. 27, 47 (1949).
9
This emphasis is criticized in the dissent by Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Harlan. United
States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966). See also 20 Sw. L.J. 420 (1966).
91Markham, supra note 85, at 411. Backman, supra note 53, at 669 has argued that a similar
confusion arose in the Court's Penn-Olin decision since the Court failed to distinguish between potential competition and a potential competitor. See also Hale & Hale, Potential Competition Under
Section 7: The Supreme Court's Crystal Ball, 1964 SuP. CT. REV. 171.
"'Berghoff, The Size Barrier in Merger Law-Or Antitrust by the Numbers, 27 OHIO ST.
L.J. 76 (1966).
'"United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 458 (1964).
"4MASON,

ECONOMIC

CONCENTRATION

AND

THE

MONOPOLY

PROBLEM

400

(1957).

See

also Miller, Measures of Monopoly Power and Concentration: Their Economic Significance, in
BUSINESS CONCENTRATION
AND PRICE POLICY 134-35
(1955);
NELSON,
IN THE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES OF THE UNITED STATES 3-4 (1962).

CONCENTRATION
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Kaysen and Turner, Stigler, Markham, and Bok," and pointed out that
the merger would fail each one. To date, however, the Court has not
specified "the smallest market share which would still be considered to

threaten undue concentration.""
Supporters of the Court's position with respect to market shares argue
that (a) there is a general correlation between concentration and compe-

tition, 7 (b) economic theory is inadequate to permit a detailed case-bycase analysis of the probable competitive consequences of a merger,"

(c) a detailed factual inquiry would largely destroy the effectiveness of
section 7, due to "limited enforcement resources" and the "wide variety
of fact situations"" and (d) the importance of past mergers in creating
present oligopolistic industries suggests that should error be made, it
should be in the direction of more, rather than less, restrictions on external
growth.'"

Concerning mergers which may substantially lessen competition, section 7 imposes a competitive test, not a market share standard. If antimerger policy is to seek atomistic or fragmented markets, and a defensible

argument can be made for such a policy, then the competitive test should
be explicitly eliminated.' Moreover, it seems somewhat inconsistent to
"doubt that economic evidence can usefully go very far in specific cases,
as a matter of proof" while, at the same time, having "considerable confidence in .. . economic postulates about structure and competition. 1 ..
But more importantly, the vagueness of the relevant market concept in
antimerger law leaves concentration data with little meaning."°

The Relevant Market In Brown Shoe and PhiladelphiaNat'l Bank, the
Court established the proposition that there are markets-within-markets
and that the narrowest reasonable market is the relevant one."° This asser9 KAYSEN & TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY (1959); Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and
the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARv. L. REV. 226 (1960); Markham, Merger Policy
Under the New Section 7: A Six-Year Appraisal, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226 (1960). Kaysen & Turner
and Stigler suggest a 20 per cent market-share percentage as the test of prima facie unlawfulness;
Markham a 25 per cent market-share; and Bok a 7 or 8 per cent increase in market concentration.
"'United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 364 (1963).
97See Turner, supra note 80, at 1315-16.
"See Bok, supra note 95, at 349; Edwards, Tests of Probable Effect Under the Clayton Act,
9 ANTITRUST BULL. 369, 377 (1964).

"Turner, supra note 80, at 1318-19: "With a wide variety of fact situations, the precedential
value of particular decisions-their value as guides to the legality of other mergers-would be
limited. Inevitably, the number of mergers with substantial anticompetitive effects would tend
to increase."
""[T]he social cost of error from being too easy in merger policy is more serious and less
easily reversed than from being too strict." Heflebower, Corporate Mergers: Policy and Economic
Analysis, 77 Q.J. oF EcoN. 537, 558 (1963).
"'s Phillips, Mergers and Competition: The Turn of the Screw, THE WHARTON REPORT, Fall
1965, p. 7. See Rill, supra note 85, for a discussion of the theory of social competition.
... Rahl, Anti-Merger Law in Search of a Policy, 11 ANTITRUST BULL. 325, 346 (1966). As
Markham, supra note 85, at 404, has argued: "Since the law does not define what constitutes a
substantial lessening of competition or a tendency to create a monopoly and since the content of
both of these tests is essentially and ultimately economic, their application falls logically within the
competence of the economist." See also Bock, The Relativity of Economic Evidence in Merger
Cases-Emerging Decisions Force the Issues, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1355 (1965).
103Hall & Phillips, Antimerger Criteria: Power, Concentration, Foreclosure and Size, 9 VILL.
L. REV. 211, 218 (1964).
'0 The outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity
of demand between the product itself
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tion is not very helpful, since it avoids the problem of specifying the supply and demand relationships between the merging firms. Thus, in Continental Can, the Court's market share data of a combined glass and metal
container market is seriously deficient and confusing, for "percentage shares
of an amalgamated glass and can container market must be taken more
lightly than comparable percentages of either a glass container market or
a can container market."'' Such a conclusion follows from the fact that
inter-industry competition is much weaker than intra-industry rivalry.
Moreover, the Court's refusal to include plastic containers, which certainly
compete with glass and metal containers, remains a mystery.'" And in
Alcoa, the Court ignored the careful economic analysis of the lower court
with respect to the relevant product market and simply lumped bare
and insulated aluminum cable into an "aluminum conductor" market."7
Similar problems arise with respect to the relevant geographic market.
Any appropriate section of the country may be considered a geographic
submarket. But Congress' approach to the definition of the relevant market
requires a degree of economic awareness. To quote again from Brown
Shoe: "The geographic market selected must, therefore, both 'correspond
to the commercial realities' of the industry and be economically significant.'' s Despite this reasoning, Pabst seems to suggest that the enforcement agencies are free to adopt almost any geographic market they wish.'
Market shares of arbitrarily defined product and geographic markets
and substitutes for it. However, within the broad market, well-defined submarkets
may exist which, in themselves, constitute product markets for antitrust purposes.
. . . The boundaries of such a submarket may be determined by examining such practical indicia as industry or public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic
entity, the product's peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facilities,
distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes and specialized vendors.
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962). (Footnotes and citation omitted.)
115Turner, supra note 80, at 1374 n.79.
'Reasoned
the majority:
Nor are we concerned by the suggestion that if the product market is to be defined in these terms it must include plastic, paper, foil and any other materials competing for the same business. That there may be a broader product market made up
of metal, glass and other competing containers does not necessarily negative the existence of sub-markets of cans, glass, plastic or cans and glass together, for 'within
this broad market, well-defined submarkets may exist which, in themselves, constitute
product markets for antitrust purposes.'
United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 457-58 (1964). (Citation omitted.)
Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented, saying in part:
It [the Court] chooses . . . to invent a line of commerce the existence of which no
one, not even the Government, has imagined; for which businessmen and economists
will look in vain; a line of commerce which sprang into existence only when the
merger took place and will cease to exist when the merger is undone.
Id. at 476-77. See also MASSEL, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY 236-78 (1962); Mann & Lewyn,
The Relevant Market Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act: Two New Cases-Two Different Views,
47 VA. L. REV. 1014 (1961); Schlade, Proposed Objective Relevant Product Market Criteria Under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 35 U. CINC. L. REv. 376 (1966);
Shapiro & Kareken, Lines of Commerce, Standards of Illegality, and Section 7 Predictability, 40
N.Y.U.L. REv. 628 (1965); Comment, 1964 Developments in the Application of Section Seven
of the Clayton Act to Horizontal Acquisitions, 33 FORDHAM L. REV. 274 (1964); Note, Definition
of a Line of Commerce Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 114 (1965).
07 See dissenting opinion of Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Harlan and Goldberg, in United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 280-87 (1964).
'Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336-37 (1962).
"'If the Supreme Court adheres to its position in the Pabst case, there will be no need to
define geographic markets in merger litigation." Hale & Hale, Delineating the Geographic Market:
A Problem in Merger Cases, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 538, 553 (1966).
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are meaningless. As Justice Fortas wrote in his concurring opinion in

Pabst:
In some situations, arithmetic as to the merging companies' aggregate
volume of sales of the commodity involved may be impressive. Sometimes,
the resulting size of the conjoined companies is great. But unless it can be
shown that the effect may be 'substantially to lessen competition or tend
to create a monopoly' in a specific section of the country, courts are not
authorized to condemn the acquisition. . . . Unless both the product and
geographical market are carefully defined, neither analysis nor result in antitrust is likely to be of acceptable quality. 1 °

The growing emphasis upon concentration data destroys the basic
foundation of a strict antimerger policy. Relative size of firms becomes
an evil in itself.111 Moreover, the subjectivity and arbitrariness of antimerger standards are significantly increased. It is now "possible to gerrymander the boundaries of the broad market involved so as to insure the
desired result.1'" 2 In short, antimerger policy loses predictability. "
It is not being suggested that section 7 cases should become "dumping
grounds for masses of economic data" that are "superfluous," or that it
is necessary "to launch a minute scrutiny of unimportant market indicia.... 4 Should this occur, it would surely be true that "the number of
mergers with substantial anticompetitive effects would tend to increase. '1 s
Rather, it is being argued that since concentration is not an adequate proxy
for all the determinants of competitive behavior, the competitive test requires-in addition to market shares of carefully defined relevant markets
-an economic analysis of such factors as economies of scale, barriers to
entry, and supply and demand functions."' It is significant that the
Supreme Court, in nine of the eleven decisions, reversed lower court decisions that were based on more complete economic analysis than used by
the Court.
Administrative Discretionary Power The Supreme Court, in its antimerger decisions, has failed to establish criteria for separating the lawful
from the unlawful.117 In Brown Shoe, it was noted that a merger involv110 United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 562 (1966). See also concurring opinions
of Justice White, Justice Douglas, and Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Stewart. Ibid.
...Comment, Clayton Section 7: A Critical Appraisal of the Supreme Court's Antitrust-AntiBigness Complex in Merger Litigation Since the Brown Shoe Case, 11 WAYNE L. REV. 739 (1965).
...Note, The ABC's of Clayton 7: Amendment of 1950; Brown Shoe; The Court and Current
Complexities, 10 VILL. L. REv. 734, 804 (1965). See also Bond, Development of the "Relevant
Market" Concept in Clayton Act Litigation, 15 MERCER L. REV. 358 (1964).
...Shapiro & Kareken, supra note 106, at 649. But see Celler, The Celler-Kefauver Act and
the Quest
for Market Certainty, 50 A.B.A.J. 559 (1964).
4
.. See Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 5 29277, at 37623 n.2 (Dec. 16, 1960).
.. Turner, supra note 80, at 1319.
1
11n n Von's Grocery, for example, the Court simply ignored the lower court's findings that
(a) while the number of "single" stores had declined, the number of "multiple" stores had increased from 856 to 958 between 1950 and 1963; (b) entry into the industry, particularly for
anyone with experience, was relatively easy; and (c) the shift to multiple stores was a response
to consumer demand and to competition being offered by cooperatives and discount houses. See
United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1965).
117 Commissioner Reilly of the FTC apparently disagrees:
Contrary to the expressions of some, the case approach and the decisions of the
Supreme Court provide considerable guidance as to both the kinds of mergers that
are illegal and the way in which the agencies should organize anti-merger enforce-
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ing a failing firm or two firms too small to compete in an industry dominated by giants would presumably be legal.1 ' But these possible defenses
remain dicta, since they have yet to be subjected to detailed judicial investigation.1 9' This factor, combined with the Court's seeming willingness
to stop any merger seriously challenged by the Justice Department or the
FTC," indicates that the criteria used by the enforcement agencies in
choosing which mergers to challenge have become highly relevant.''
The basic problem is that too little is known about the decision-making
process employed by either the Department of Justice or the FTC. An
analysis of the complaints filed by the two agencies under section 7 suggests certain criteria,"' but such an analysis fails to indicate the criteria
that resulted in a decision not to prosecute certain mergers. And, since it
is likely that under the broad criteria enumerated by the Court the enforcement agencies could challenge more mergers than in fact they do
(for budgetary reasons, among others), "an increasingly large amount of
merger policy is being determined at the administrative level of government. ' '". As two commentators have put it: "The failure to formulate and
communicate policies may not only thwart policy review, both inside and
outside the department, but it prevents the business community from
following guidelines.""' 4
The Antitrust Division is developing rules and guidelines for a number
of antitrust problems, including mergers, but has given no indication when
they will be promulgated."' The Federal Trade Commission appears to
be taking a different approach. In Permanente Cement Co. the Commission delayed ruling on a vertical acquisition pending a trade regulation
rule proceeding instituted to study and consider the problem of vertical
integration in the cement industry."' Such procedures should aid the
ment. Certainly in view of the Supreme Court's decision in the Von's case, there can
be little misunderstanding as to the kinds of horizontal mergers that are likely to be
illegal.
Reilly, Conglomerate Mergers-An Argument for Action, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 522, 536 (1966).
See also Hurley, Merger Policy and the Celler-Kefanver Act, 8 ST. Louis U.L.J. 379 (1964).
.. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 319 (1962).
119 Connor, Section 7 of the Clayton Act: The Failing Company "Myth," 49 GEo. L.J. 84
(1960); Hale & Hale, Failing Firms and the Merger Provisions of the Antitrust Laws, 52 Ky.
L.J. 597 (1964); Weiley, The "Failing Company," 41 B.U.L. REV. (1961); Comment, Federal
Antitrust Law-Mergers-An Updating of the "Failing Company" Doctrine in the Amended Section 7 Setting, 61 MICH. L. REV. 566 (1963); Note, Horizontal Mergers and the "Failing Firm"
Defense Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A Caveat, 45 VA. L. REV. 421 (1959).
120 RahI, supra note 102, at 329.
"..It is not being implied that section 7 is standardless. Rather, it is being argued that the
criteria are so broad that almost any merger could be held to violate the Clayton Act. See Dirlam,
Recent Developments in the Anti-Merger Policy: A Diversity of Standards, 9 ANTITRUST BULL.
381 (1964).
"' See BOCK, MERGERS AND MARKETS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST FIFTEEN YEARS
UNDER THE MERGER ACT OF 1950 (1966).
"a Address by M. A. Wright, President of the United States Chamber of Commerce, before
the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce, Sept. 8, 1966.
24 Lewyn & Mann, Some Thoughts on Policy and Enforcement of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 50 A.B.A.J. 154, 157 (1964).
.1.
BNA, Proposed Merger Guidelines (panel discussion, Federal Bar Association, 1965) at 2-3.
110Permanente Cement Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (1963-1965 Transfer Binder)
16885 at
21924-25. See FTC, ECONOMIC REPORT ON MERGERS AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN THE
CEMENT INDUSTRY (1966). The FTC's guidelines for the cement and food-distribution industries
were announced early in 1967. See 1 TRADE REG. REP. 5 4500 (1967). Briefly, with respect to the
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present problem of predictability, but they also raise numerous questions.
For example: "Promulgation of numerous rules with a pattern of sufficient
intricacy to cover the immense variety in merger situations, without adequate policy delineation, has all the hazards that beset another Greek,
Daedalus, who built a beautiful
labyrinth for a king, and then could not
127
find his own way out of it."s
III. CONCLUSIONS

Under the diversity of standards developed by the Supreme Court in
its first eleven antimerger decisions, public policy toward mergers is bound
to be strict and to have an important influence on the future industrial
structure of the country. Emphasis upon both actual and potential competition, market foreclosure, concentration and market shares, size, and
reciprocity, indicates that few mergers in which one or both of the parties
are large relative to some market will pass judicial scrutiny. "There is
now little doubt that in Section 7 of the Clayton Act the presumption
seems clearly against growth through merger, and a heavy burden of
proof rests on companies which wish to grow by merger, especially if the
industry structure is of the oligopoly variety.'' s
Yet, a review of the Court's decisions suggests a disturbing trend, one
which tends to destroy the basic foundation of a strict antimerger policy.
This trend involves a switch from a market power standard, as stated in
Brown Shoe, to a market structure standard, with particular emphasis on
concentration. A relatively simple model has been adopted by the Court
which equates the effectiveness of competition with the numbr of viable
competitors. Consequently, any merger which threatens to diminish the
number of viable competitors and/or which is part of an industry trend
should be prohibited. Unconcentrated market structures are regarded as
desirable regardless of behavior or performance."'
The Court's philosophy is perhaps best summarized in the following
quotation from Von's Grocery:
By using

. . .

terms in § 7 which look not merely to the actual present effect

cement industry, the Commission announced that it will challenge every future acquisition by a
cement producer of any "substantial" ready-mixed concrete company. ("Substantial" was defined
as any concrete concern ranking among the four largest in any market or any that regularly purchases 50,000 barrels or more of cement annually.) Further, the guidelines require all portland
cement makers to file a notification sixty days before any merger or acquisition involving a readymixed concrete company.
For a discussion of the FTC's approach, see two articles by Commissioner Elman: The Need for
Certainty and Predictability in the Application of the Merger Law, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 613 (1965),
and Rulemaking Procedures in the FTC's Enforcement of the Merger Law, 78 HARv. L. REv.
385 (1964). But see Burrus & Savarese, Institutional Decision-Making and the Problem of Fairness
in FTC Antitrust Enforcement, 53 GEo. L.J. 656 (1965).
12 Rahl, supra note 102, at 332. The basic problem, according to Rahl, "is not lack of rules
of law, but lack of a guiding policy for the law. Promulgation of a rule to carry out an undefined
policy is risky. . . . Moreover, when a given antitrust policy is reasonably well-defined, there is
not much need for very many specific rules. Given the policy, the courts will usually do rather
well in applying it." Id. at 331-32.
128 Lanzillotti, Market Structure and Antitrust Vulnerability, 8 ANTITRUST BULL. 853, 857
(1963).
9Handler & Robinson, The Supreme Court vs. Corporate Mergers, FORTUNE, Jan. 1965, p. 176.
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of a merger but instead to its effect upon future competition, Congress sought
to preserve competition among many small businesses by arresting a trend
toward concentration in its incipiency before that trend developed to the
point that a market was left in the grip of a few big companies. Thus,
where concentration is gaining momentum in a market, we must be alert
to carry out Congress' intent to protect competition against ever increasing
concentration through mergers."
Given this interpretation, the Court must necessarily be strict toward
the elimination of smaller competitors, since it seeks to prevent largenumber markets, in which it believes competition to be strong, from
becoming small-number markets, in which it believes oligopolistic patterns
of behavior to emerge.' Injury to competitors, moreover, becomes equated
with injury to competition. Further, the Court's model does not require
either a careful delineation of the relevant market or an analysis of the
probable effect of the merger on competition.
These conclusions raise a number of questions concerning the future
of antimerger policy. The Court's model is static, not dynamic, since it
seeks to preserve present market structures without a careful analysis of the
probable effects of a merger on competition. It may not, in the long run,
even protect small businesses and may decrease business incentives. Particularly with respect to vertical and conglomerate mergers, the model may
prevent the achievement of efficiency. And, finally, the strictness of the
model, resulting in a corresponding increase in the discretionary powers of
the enforcement agencies, raises concern about the agencies' decisionmaking processes. But of even more importance, the invention of oversimplified rules and relevant markets, at the expense of careful analysis to
see that they correspond with economic realities, cannot serve the cause of
those who, like the present author, believe in a strong procompetitive
policy. 3' For it is, in the final analysis, the criteria employed by the Court
which determine both the guidelines for business decisions and the future
course of antimerger policy.

"0 United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 275-77 (1966).

(Footnotes and citation

omitted.)
...The Court's concern with small business is not new in antitrust history. Said Judge Hand,
for instance, in a 1945 decision: "Throughout the history of [the antitrust statutes] . . . it has
been constantly assumed that one of their purposes was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own
sake and in spite of possible cost, an organization of industry in small units which can effectively
compete with each other." United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d
Cir. 1945).
1""Inevitably, simple, arbitrary tests disregard too many highly significant factors and become
sweeping absolutes of universal application with highly questionable validity." Bison, The Von's
Merger Case-Antitrust in Reverse, 55 GEO. L.J. 201 (1966).

